国企混改、股权激励与企业绩效--基于格力电器的案例研究

本文从国企混改进入全方位深化的现实背景出发,对格力电器自上市以来混合所有制改革进行深入研究,分析了公司混改方案及对应的股权结构的变化。通过EVA分析得到混改导致公司财务业绩大幅上升,并从股权激励的视角分析了格力电器市盈率长期低于美的集团的现象。随着格力电器新一轮混改的完成,可以预见其将为相关各方创造更大价值。格力电器混改的模式对国有企业混改特别是竞争性国企混改具有借鉴意义。     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

投资者法律保护、股权集中度与大股东行为

在不同的法系和国家中,对投资者的法律保护存在很大的差异。作为对投资者法律保护的替代,在投资者法律保护薄弱的国家,股权结构相对集中。为了保护投资者的利益,我国应该完善对投资者的法律保护,提高执法质量和会计质量,促进股权的适度集中,限制控制股东的掠夺行为。     

非国有大股东对国企超额雇员的影响:成本效应还是激励效应

基于竞争理论的国企改革思路强调减少政策性负担摊派,基于产权理论的改革思路侧重于引入非国有资本,以解决产权不清晰与所有者缺位问题.本文尝试融合两种理论,以国企超额雇员问题为研究对象,从非国有大股东视角探究混合所有制改革成效.研究发现:非国有大股东能够显著降低国企超额雇员,减弱超额雇员对公司价值的损害作用,且该治理作用会随非国有大股东相对力量的提高而增强;从作用机制来看,该治理作用不仅表现为劳动力成本尤其是员工薪酬的节约,还表现为内部薪酬差距和管理层薪酬业绩敏感性的提高,兼具成本效应与激励效应;该作用在地区就业压力较小、劳动密集度较低以及劳动保护水平更低的环境下更为显著.     

Will future land based food and fibre production be in family or corporate hands? An analysis of farm land ownership and governance considering farmer characteristics as choice drivers. The New Zealand case

Family farming in various guises has been the dominant ownership and governance system in primary production over recorded history. This outcome has been controlled by farmers and their families, possibly due to tradition, opportunities, personal characteristics, skill sets and the nature of primary production. Of these, it is hypothesised that the farmers’ personal characteristics play a major part in the choice, and continuance, of current ownership and governance systems. Equally as important, they, and therefore the land ownership system, play a part in the efficiency of production systems and improvement of the biological and production environment.The benefits and difficulties of commonly used ownership systems in Western society are reviewed. Using a sample of New Zealand (NZ) farms, a comparison of the managers’ features for owner/operator, partnership and corporate based systems is presented. There were significant differences in many variables including the farmers’ age, education, number of children, asset levels, years on the current farm, and similar, but more importantly, the farmers in the ownership system groups had differing personal characteristics. Significantly, despite the corporate based farms employing more professional assistance, the profit levels were similar across ownership systems leaving the farmers’ characteristics the main factors correlating with system choice. However, governance systems per se are only marginally correlated with production systems and efficiency.As successive generations of farmers are unlikely to have different characteristics, and corporate based systems continue to exhibit similar profit levels, relatively simple family based systems will continue to dominate farm land ownership and control. The trends suggest family farms will increase in size and involve family conglomerates facilitating the management of larger, and in many cases multiple, farms. While currently there are few differences in biological efficiency between ownership systems, given the efficiency benefits of size and scale, this could well change with the increase of family conglomerates. Relative to increasing corporatisation, the continuance of family based ownership and governance will also be of benefit to the environment. When developing land policies, these highlighted relationships should be taken into account. This study is a first to consider personal characteristics relative to ownership.     

Does economic policy uncertainty raise corporate precautionary cash holdings? Evidence from China

Using China as the research setting, this paper investigates the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical results show a U-shaped relation between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical analysis, in terms of ownership structure, firm size, corporate competitiveness and geographical location, further shows that (i) the effects for economic policy uncertainty in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are significant, but the effect is stronger for state-owned enterprises; (ii) such significant effect is also found more strongly in small and medium-sized enterprises and highly competitive enterprises; and (iii) the effects for eastern, central and western China are all statistically significant, but the effect is strongest for eastern China.     

上市公司股权结构与股利政策相关性实证分析——西北五省区的数据

本文以2002年~2004年西北五省区有股利分配的上市公司作为样本,采用多元回归分析方法,验证股权结构自变量与股利之间的线性关系,用非线性回归方法检验未通过线性关系检验的自变量与股利之间的关系。结果发现,西北五省区股利偏低,股东对现金股利有不同偏好。     

DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT RETURN. The role of fund value maximization and public choice theory

Public pension plans are a major type of institutional owner during the new era of investor capitalism, yet little is known about them. Based upon fund value maximization (FVM) and public choice theory (PCT), we develop hypotheses on the determinants of plan performance as measured by plan annual investment return. FVM espouses that the plan's fund or investment portfolio will be invested to maximize return for a given level of risk, while PCT holds that agency costs are significant in the public sector, and will have a negative effect on plan return. Using biennial pension plan data for 1992–96 for several hundred plans, we found that fund value maximization has a much greater influence on plan performance, but that plan performance is also subject to agency costs associated with public choice theory.     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.     

Exchange rates and ownership structure of Japanese multinational firms

This paper investigates the determinants of Japanese multinationals’ ownership structures. Unlike most previous studies that neglect the impact of financial constraints on ownership, we add the exchange rate as a measure of wealth and test whether exchange rates affect the ownership share of foreign direct investment projects. After controlling for other variables that affect ownership, we find that exchange rates have a significant effect on the likelihood of wholly owned subsidiaries. We also discuss several other explanations for the link between exchange rates and foreign direct investment and provide evidence that the link stems from capital-market imperfections.